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During this crisis the very low case-
fatality rate may be attributed to the
quick assistance provided along the
road. It is also possible that the
returnees might have developed some
immunity to cholera, following the
1994 outbreak in Goma. The Goma
Epidemiology Group1 estimated that
almost all refugees were infected by
Vibrio cholerae during that period.
Now that returnees are in their
communes, active surveillance should
be continued daily for suspected
cholera cases (MOH/WHO
recommendations). The cholera
outbreak described may be regarded as
being of moderate severity, but it is
likely that in the coming weeks,
vulnerable groups among the Rwandan
population will need more attention.
Co-ordination between MOH, UN
agencies and NGOs will remain
essential to maximise efficiency of
emergency health intervention.
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which 8916 were for watery diarrhoeal
diseases, representing 57% of the total
consultations in both préfectures
(figure). A total of 4408 diarrhoea cases
occurred among children under 5 years
of age (49% of total diarrhoeal cases).
Diarrhoeal cases increased from Nov
16 to 18, and decreased from Nov 19
to 24. From Nov 16 to 24 the attack
rate was 25·4/1000 (8916 per 350 000).
A total of 47 deaths, of which 36 were
reported by MSF, were recorded by
MOH/WHO. MSF registered a case
fatality rate of 0·4% (36/8916). From
the 44 stool samples analysed in Kigali
(CHK), 40 tested positive for Vibrio
cholerae O1. Of the 16 samples sent to
Institute Pasteur, eight tested positive
for Vibrio Cholerae O1, serotype Inaba.
UN aid agencies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)
had prepared emergency plans in
advance, but the magnitude of the
population displacement surprised
everyone. For operational purposes all
diarrhoeal or dehydrated patients were
treated according to their hydration
status. The surveillance system used
did not allow the distinction between
cholera cases and watery diarrhoea due
to other causes. The continuous fall in
the number of diarrhoea cases
registered from Nov 19 was attributed
to the parallel decrease of the target
population as the column of returnees
moved on. Also, several stations had to
be closed on Rwandan Government
orders. Although the quality of the data
collection varied among health
facilities, trends remain reliable. The
very high number of registered
diarrhoeal cases is indisputable. This
outbreak, among which an unknown
but probably important number of
cases were cholera, is unique in terms
of low case-fatality rates. Epidemics of
diarrhoea reported lately have been
associated with high mortality rates
(Kurdish refugees in 1991, displaced
Somalis in 1992, Burundian refugees in
Rwanda and in Tanzania in 1993,
Rwanda refugees in Goma in 1994).
Cholera outbreak during
massive influx of Rwandan
returnees in November,
1996
SIR—From Nov 16 to 24, 1996, nearly
half a million Rwandan returnees
coming from five camps in north
Goma, east Zaire, entered Rwanda
through Gisenyi. By Nov 24, most of
the returnees had reached their home
communes in the préfectures of Gisenyi
and Ruhengeri, and in rural Kigali. To
assist the returning population,
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
operated health facilities in various
contexts: road stations, existing transit
camps, hospital support, and mobile
units along the 63 km Gisenyi-
Ruhengeri route. This system ensured
one health facility every 6 km, equipped
with oral and intravenous rehydration,
and provided dressings and basic
treatments, BP5 (high-energy protein)
biscuits, latrines, and water. Cholera-
treatment centres, set up in tents,
allowed infection-control measures.
A simple surveillance system was
established. Morbidity and mortality
data were tallied daily at each site.
Because of difficult working conditions,
the case definition used for possible
cholera was any patient presenting with
acute diarrhoea of rapid onset with
dehydration, with or without vomiting.
From Nov 13 to 25, 44 stool samples
were collected among returnees by the
ministry of health (MOH), WHO,
Central Hospital of Kigali, and MSF
from Goma (4), Gisenyi (25),
Ruhengeri (8), and Kigali (7), and
analysed by the CHK laboratory/Swiss
Disaster Relief team. In addition, 16
stool samples from Goma (7) and
Gisenyi-Ruhengeri (9) were sent to
MSF to Institute Pasteur, France. By
counting the number of persons per
hour on the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri route
MSF estimated a total of 350 000
returnees, between Nov 16 and 24.
MSF provided 15 675 consultations of
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Diarrhoea/suspected cholera cases in Rwandan returnees,
Nov 16–24, 1996
MSF centres Gisenyi and Ruhengeri préfectures, Rwanda.
Emergency medical aid for
refugees
SIR—We agree with The Lancet’s
assertion that emergency medical aid is
not for amateurs (Nov 23, p 1393)1 but
we do take issue with the solution that
you propose—yet another multinational
task force. This force would only
produce a highly centralised, poorly
controlled, and unaccountable
bureaucracy. There are no quick fixes.
In the world of humanitarian medical
aid, it is essential to recognise the
differing agendas of donors, of national,
international, and multinational
implementing agencies, and of
governments. For example, expert
intelligence on movements of refugees
in Zaire and Rwanda was almost
certainly withheld from aid agencies by
those preoccupied with political and
military concerns. Humanitarian
organisations, donor agencies, and
other institutions need alternative, self-
reliant strategies to ensure that aid
donors get value for money. One such
strategy is a defined career structure for
those entering into medical relief.
